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This article uses the cases of Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone to 
analyse transitional justice processes in African societies where power-
sharing was used as a key tool to end very protracted and violent civil wars. 
It is argued that, by affording warring parties a prominent role in the post-
settlement political environment, power-sharing inadvertently impeded 
the pursuit of both restorative and criminal justice in all three countries. 
As an instance of ‘warriors’ justice’, power-sharing was used by such actors 
as an opportunity to avoid facing retributive justice. Indeed, due to the 
central position they held within the power-sharing dispensations, former 
warriors emphasised amnesty while paying lip service to reparations for 
victims. In all three countries, the decision to revert to the international 
judicial system or not was mainly motivated by political calculations 
rather than any genuine concern for justice. However, notwithstanding the 
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shortcomings above, the consensus brought about by the power-sharing 
dispensations enabled the three countries to effect meaningful institutional 
reforms, albeit with limited and different levels of success.
Keywords: power-sharing, transitional justice, civil war, Burundi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone
1. Introduction
The post-1990 world environment has witnessed a radical shift in the nature 
of wars around the world, characterised by a decrease of interstate wars and 
an increase in the number of internal or civil wars. Civil wars take place 
in individual states and involve civilians as both fighters and principal 
victims of atrocities. The fact that civil wars result in the commission of 
large scale atrocities against civilians brings about the need for the pursuit 
of post-conf lict or transitional justice as one of the conditions for achieving 
sustainable peace. 
Transitional justice thus poses a major challenge to societies emerging 
from civil war. The situation becomes even more complex when dealing 
with post-conf lict societies where the resolution of the conf lict involved 
negotiations and the establishment of an all-inclusive power-sharing 
transitional mechanism. As former fighters become new rulers and are 
directly involved in state management under the transitional power-sharing 
dispensation, several questions arise. Can those responsible for committing 
atrocities during the fighting be expected to champion the cause of justice 
once in power? Can those responsible for wartime atrocities be dragged 
into transitional justice mechanisms without endangering the fragile post-
settlement peace? Does power-sharing as a conf lict resolution strategy 
promote impunity and undermine justice in post-conf lict societies?
This article seeks to answer the questions raised above (and others), 
relating to the challenge of pursuing transitional justice in post-violence 
societies where the resolution of the conf lict involved power-sharing. 
It discusses the cases of three African countries that have in recent years 
reverted to power-sharing as the main mode of war termination, namely 
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Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.1 Two criteria have dictated the 
selection of the case studies. Firstly, all cases involved herein relate to civil 
wars that ended in negotiations (as opposed to military victory by one of 
the fighting parties). Secondly, the chosen cases are spread evenly across 
three different African regions, namely central Africa (Burundi), southern 
Africa (Mozambique) and western Africa (Sierra Leone) as a way to ensure 
geographical balance.
The main argument of this article is that, while each of the three countries 
analysed herein resorted to some form of transitional justice mechanisms 
to deal with civil war-related atrocities, they only applied justice aspects 
that were not meant to threaten their elites’ political survival, freedom 
and personal security. This situation was the result of the war termination 
strategy applied in these countries, namely negotiations followed by 
power-sharing, which had suddenly turned former warring parties into 
key stakeholders in the transitional dispensations of these countries. 
Before discussing the specific country cases, it appears important to clarify 
the concepts of power-sharing and transitional justice, attempting to 
highlight philosophical tensions between the two.  
Conceptual clarification: Power-sharing and 
transitional justice 
Debating power-sharing
As concepts, power-sharing and the different mechanisms designed for its 
operationalisation (government of national unity, inclusive government or 
1 Although other African countries would meet the set criteria, space did not allow for all 
to be included. In fact, the initial research for this article involved six countries, namely 
Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra 
Leone. However, the need to comply with length limits made it necessary to split the initial 
article into two, each sharing the same theoretical framework. This first one focuses on 
Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone while the second will be dedicated to Angola, 
the DRC and Liberia. Also, although a potentially very relevant case for this study, South 




coalition government) are prone to semantic confusion. In fact, two strands 
of research use the term power-sharing, often without recognising the 
differences between them (Jarstad 2008:108). The first strand, labelled the 
‘consociational democracy’ school, is concerned with practical strategies 
of distributing power among socio-political stakeholders in divided 
societies as a means to guarantee adequate group representation and 
foster democratic participation. One of its renowned proponents, Arend 
Lijphart (1999), was concerned with addressing the exclusion of minorities 
brought about by a rigorous application of liberal democratic principles 
and rules in ethnically and/or religiously divided societies and where 
political allegiances may align with ethnic and/or religious identities. 
In such societies, Lijphart argues, majority rule is not only undemocratic, 
but also dangerous; it spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather 
than democracy. He thus proposed consociational democracy, a group-
based form of democracy, grounded on a grand coalition of the political 
leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; mutual veto rule 
(which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests); 
proportionality (as the principal standard of political representation, civil 
service appointments and public funds allocation); as well as a high degree 
of autonomy of each segment of society to run its own internal affairs 
(Lijphart 1977). 
The second strand of research relating to power-sharing is rooted in the 
field of conf lict management. ‘In this discourse the main function of power 
sharing is to end violence’ (Jarstad 2008:108). This practice of power-
sharing generally emerges in the context of stalemated civil wars. It is based 
on the understanding that ‘[b]y dividing power among rival groups during 
the transition, power sharing reduces the danger that one party will become 
dominant and threaten the security of others’ (Papagianni 2008:1). This 
is insofar relevant as exclusion is one of the main drivers of conf licts on 
the African continent (Lemarchand 2006). In this regard, it is no surprise 
that, with its emphasis on the inclusion of non-state stakeholders (armed 
groups, political parties and civil society organisations) in transitional 
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mechanisms, power-sharing has been commended as ‘a recipe for peaceful 
cohabitation’ (Lemarchand 2006:2).
This article focuses on the conf lict management dimension of power-
sharing. It examines the practice of power-sharing as an incentive towards 
ending internal armed conf lict. In contrast to the consociational approach 
that is both preventive and built on a long-term perspective, the conf lict 
management dimension of power-sharing is reactive and temporary. 
It seeks to address the problem of power illegitimacy through accommodative 
transitional mechanisms entrusted with conducting free and inclusive 
elections for institutional renewal in ‘post-settlement’ societies. Provisions 
of power-sharing in this approach are generally derived from peace (or 
political) agreements signed by parties and, depending on a specific conf lict 
situation, guarantee ‘the participation of representatives of significant 
groups… in the executive, but also in the legislature, judiciary, police and 
army’ (Papagianni 2008:42).
Understanding transitional justice
Transitional justice can be defined as the full range of ‘processes, strategies 
and institutions that assist post-conf lict or post-authoritarian societies in 
accounting for histories of mass abuse as they build peaceful and just states …’ 
(Armstrong and Ntegeye 2006:3). It seeks to
… halt ongoing human rights abuses; investigate past crimes; identify those 
responsible for human rights violations; impose sanctions for some of 
those responsible for serious human rights violations; provide reparations 
to victims; prevent future abuses; preserve and enhance sustainable peace 
and promote [community] and national reconciliation (Fombad 2008).
Overall, there is a need to distinguish between three different sets 
of transitional justice mechanisms. Firstly, there are those targeting 
perpetrators, namely trials, exiles, vetting or purges and amnesties. Secondly, 
there are ‘victim-oriented restorative justice processes’ (Olsen, Payne and 
Reiter 2010:803) that include reparations or compensations and victims’ 
empowerment programmes. Thirdly, there are mechanisms targeting the 
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wider society, including institutional reforms, truth commissions, and 
other public memory projects whose aim is ‘to officially recognize but 
pardon past acts’ (Olsen, Payne and Reiter 2010:803). However, as Bhargava 
(2000:54) argues, in spite of their institutional variation, the shared 
overarching goal of all transitional justice mechanisms is to restore the 
dignity of individuals and communities victimised by atrocities, deter 
future violations and prevent a repeat of past horrors. 
Power-sharing and transitional justice: Purposes  
and challenges
Power-sharing and transitional justice tend to come to prominence in 
countries emerging from civil war ended through negotiations. Whereas 
power-sharing is used in such societies to enable former warriors to partake 
in post-war politics, the pursuit of transitional justice is generally regarded 
as a guarantee to address victims and society’s wartime losses as well as to 
prevent the recurrence of violence.
Power-sharing and transitional justice can both be very effective, but in the 
implementation of each of them, seriously challenging problems may arise – 
which have already attracted waves of criticisms. As far as power-sharing 
is concerned, it has been argued that the ‘[i]nclusion of warring parties 
in a power-sharing arrangement does not always end violence’ (Jarstad 
2008:117). Power-sharing is also said to be elite-driven and to exclude 
the general public from matters directly affecting national life and, in so 
doing, to undermine democratic processes. Lastly, by providing rebels with 
a share of state power, the practice of power-sharing tends to ‘contribute to 
the reproduction of insurgent violence [as it creates] an incentive structure 
would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path’ 
(Mehler 2009:455).
On its part, transitional justice poses a problem of timing as the ‘post-
conf lict’ context to which it is designed to apply varies from one conf lict 
situation to another. Although only processes ‘initiated within five years 
following an armed conflict’ (Binningsbø et al. 2012:733) should be regarded 
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as transitional justice, experiences in post-conf lict societies are filled with 
instances of transitional justice mechanisms being established even over a 
decade after the signing of a peace agreement. In this latter situation, the 
decision by government to set up transitional justice mechanisms can be 
seen as a ploy for pursuing political goals, including settling scores with 
political opponents.2
Transitional justice also faces a challenge with regard to its content and/or 
scope. Two scenarios ought to be distinguished in this regard. In cases of 
internal conf licts that ended in the military victory of one of the parties, 
the transitional justice mechanism is designed by the winners. Hence, it is 
criticised as victors’ justice (Reydams 2013). In cases where the war ended 
through negotiations and power-sharing, transitional justice mechanisms 
have to be agreed upon by all parties involved, especially warring parties, 
resulting in what can be termed ‘warriors’ justice’ (Sadiki 2013:254). 
The fact that alleged human rights violators are directly involved in 
determining the timing and content of transitional justice leads to the 
criticism that transitional justice is first and foremost a political matter 
and justice is simply its second, sometimes far-distant, aim. 
If anything, the potential tensions between power-sharing and transitional 
justice in post-settlement societies as highlighted above, bring about the 
debate regarding the operationalisation of transitional justice mechanisms 
or processes in scenarios involving power-sharing as a mode of civil war 
termination, as discussed below.
2 This debate has taken place in Bangladesh, for instance, where a number of high profile 
politicians have, as recently as 2014, been charged and convicted for crimes allegedly 
committed during the 1971 war with Pakistan. These include Zahid Hossain Khokon of 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Motiur Rahman Nizami of the Jamaat-el-Islami and 
Ghulam Azam of the Bangladeshi Islamist Party. They were all found guilty of war crimes 
and sentenced to penalties ranging from death to life imprisonment (Snyder 2014).     
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Dialectics of power-sharing and transitional justice in 
post-civil war Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone
According to Järvinen (2004:36), ‘[o]ne of the greatest challenges to any 
post-conf lict society is how to deal with past crimes … and other human 
rights abuses’. Firstly, internal wars generally occur in states with weak or 
dysfunctional institutions, including the justice system, which the armed 
conf lict contributes to weakening further. In this context, institutional 
inefficacy is a critical factor in the inability of post-conf lict societies to 
effectively prosecute cases of wartime crimes and human rights abuses 
(Souaré 2008). 
Secondly, civil wars are periods of utter anarchy when thousands or even 
millions of crimes are committed. The sheer number of such crimes and 
their alleged perpetrators would make it virtually impossible for even the 
most willing states to prosecute – given the amount of time and resources 
required, as well as the overall impact of such prosecutions on the society 
and its peace prospects. 
This section explores the manner in which Burundi, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone dealt with the issue of transitional justice following the 
conclusion of their respective civil wars. 
Background to the Burundian, Mozambican and Sierra 
Leonean civil wars  
Since the killings of 1972 and the subsequent establishment of the Hutu 
People’s Liberation Party – National Liberation Front (Palipehutu-FNL), 
Burundi had been experiencing a low-intensity civil war as exiled Hutus 
(mainly based in Tanzania and Rwanda) explored ways to challenge 
militarily the Tutsi-controlled regimes ruling Burundi after the 1966 
military coup. But, the crisis intensified following the assassination 
of the country’s first democratically elected and first Hutu President, 
Melchior Ndadaye, and other senior government officials from the ruling 
Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party, in October 1993. 
The assassination was the work of ‘radical’ elements within the Burundian 
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Tutsi-dominated security and political circles who were concerned with 
the prospect of losing their long-held privileged positions. 
The Burundian civil war was fought along ethnic lines, pitting the Tutsi-
controlled national government against an array of Hutu-led rebel groups, 
including the Palipehutu-FNL and the National Council for the Defence 
of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). 
The war resulted in the death of over 300 000 people and the displacement of 
1.8 million more within the country and in neighbouring states (Tanzania, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] and Rwanda) (Falch 2008:1). 
The war officially ended in 2008 following the signing of the Magaliesberg 
Peace Agreement between the Burundian government and the country’s 
last standing rebel group, the Palipehutu-FNL. However, the peace process 
had started as early as August 2000 when the Arusha Agreement for Peace 
and Reconciliation in Burundi (henceforth Arusha Agreement) was signed 
between the Burundian government and 19 political parties.
In contrast to the Burundian civil war that was essentially driven by 
internal dynamics, the Mozambican civil war (1976–1992) was a complex 
emergency triggered by several internal and external factors. On the one 
hand, it was a product of internal disagreements within FRELIMO3 and 
discontent within the Mozambican society. On the other hand, it was the 
result of interferences from the Rhodesian and Apartheid South African 
governments in their design to destabilise and, if possible, get rid of the 
Mozambican regime under President Samora Machel with its policy of 
support for liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. 
The Mozambican civil war equally embodied the characteristics of a proxy 
war within the Cold War context, pitting the Marxist-oriented FRELIMO 
(supported by the Soviet Union) against the Mozambican National 
Resistance (RENAMO) backed by the USA. The war resulted in the death of 
between 600 000 and 1 million people (Hirsch 2009) and the displacement 
3 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the country’s ruling party since independence in 




of many more both within the country and in neighbouring countries. Lastly, 
as was the case in Burundi, the Mozambican civil war ended in a stalemate, 
leading the protagonists to explore peaceful means to end the conflict. 
On its part, the Sierra Leonean civil war erupted in March 1991. It formed 
part (and was the product) of the country’s troubled post-colonial 
evolution characterised by political repression and violence, military 
coups, the politicisation of (ethnic) identities, economic collapse and 
the uninterrupted weakening of state institutions, including the security 
forces. The war was waged by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under 
the leadership of Corporal Foday Sankoh. The RUF’s official goal consisted 
of ridding Sierra Leone of the corrupt and unjust regime under President 
Joseph Mommoh (1985–1992).
However, the actual situation in areas controlled by the RUF contrasted 
significantly with the group’s public claims. The regime of fear and 
extreme violence imposed by the RUF on civilian populations contributed 
to alienating the rebel group not only from the Sierra Leonean people but 
also from the international community. 
By January 2002 when the civil war officially ended, an estimated 100 000 
people had been killed while thousands had had their arms or limbs 
amputated and approximately 2 million more had been displaced within 
and outside the country (Tejan-Cole 2009). In an effort to find a peaceful 
solution to the crisis, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) dispatched a peacekeeping mission, the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), to Sierra Leone in 1997. The ECOMOG was credited 
with, among other things, the signing of the Lomé Agreement in July 1999, 
later complemented by the Abuja Agreements I and II signed in November 
2000 and May 2001 respectively.            
Peace agreements and power-sharing in Burundi, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone
The Arusha Agreement was grounded on two main principles, namely the 
choice of negotiation as the preferred mode to end the civil war, and the 
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establishment of a transitional power-sharing mechanism involving all of 
the country’s main political stakeholders.
In spite of its significant contribution to paving the way to peace, the Arusha 
Agreement only involved the Burundian government and 19 political 
parties as all armed groups remained sceptical about the government’s 
commitment to a peaceful settlement of the conf lict. However, in 2002, 
a ceasefire agreement was signed between the government and the 
CNDD-FDD’s wing led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the 
Palipehutu-FNL’s wing led by Alain Mugabarabona. This was followed, 
in November 2003, by another agreement between the transitional 
government and the CNDD-FDD’s main wing led by Pierre Nkurunziza.
As per the Arusha Agreement, the transition was comprised of two phases 
designed to last 18 months each. In November 2001, the transition was 
inaugurated with the swearing in of sitting President Pierre Buyoya (Tutsi). 
On 30 April 2003, Buyoya handed the presidency over to his deputy, 
Domitien Ndayizeye (Hutu), for the second phase of the transition which 
was extended to August 2005 as the government failed to abide by the 
November 2004 deadline to organise the much anticipated general elections.
Power in transitional Burundi was shared between Hutus and Tutsis in 
national government, national parliament, provincial administration 
as well as the security forces. However, it ought to be observed that, in 
contrast to the civilian sector where the Hutus’ demographic superiority 
was recognised and implemented, power in the security sector was shared 
on the equalitarian ratio of 50:50 between Hutus and Tutsis. Lastly, there 
is need to recall that – in conforming with the recommendation contained 
in the Arusha Agreement for the work of the country’s transitional justice 
mechanisms to commence during the transition – President Ndayizeye 
enacted Law No 01/021 on 27 December 2004 establishing the country’s 
(first) truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). However, this 
initial TRC never got off the ground for several reasons – including the 
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fast-approaching end of the transition, the attempt by UPRONA4 and 
FRODEBU to control the TRC’s working and appointments as well as 
protests from human rights organisations regarding the political affiliation 
of the TRC’s nominated officials (International Centre for Transitional 
Justice 2011:10). As a consequence, Law No 01/021 was abrogated by Law 
No 1/18 discussed in the next section.
As far as Mozambique is concerned, tentative peace talks between the 
government and RENAMO started as early as August 1989 in Nairobi, 
through the facilitation of the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM). 
The talks involved a direct meeting between President Joachim Chissano 
(who had succeeded Samora Machel following the latter’s death in 1986) and 
Afonso Dlakhama, RENAMO’s leader. They resulted in the issuing of three 
statements that established the basis for a peace accord in Mozambique, 
namely the ‘Twelve principles for peace’ from government, RENAMO’s 
‘Six-point declaration’, as well as the ‘Seven-point proposal’ from the USA 
government (Almeida, Sanches and Raimundo 2010:7). 
Following two years of continued direct negotiations between the 
government and RENAMO under the auspices of the Community of 
Sant’Egidio, the agreement to end the civil war in Mozambique was 
signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome (Italy). The General Peace Agreement, 
as the agreement was called, began with a statement of seven protocols, 
dealing with basic principles including the establishment and recognition 
of political parties, elections, military issues, guarantees, ceasefire and 
donors. The Agreement also contained a declaration on humanitarian 
assistance, a joint declaration on the conclusion of the peace process and 
other joint communiqués and declarations signed by the parties during the 
two-year negotiation process. 
The Agreement did not provide for a power-sharing transitional 
dispensation at national level as was the case in Burundi (see above) and 
4 The Union for National Progress (UPRONA) was established in 1958 by Burundi’s first 
prime minister, Prince Louis Rwagasore. It was the country’s single party from 1966 to 
1976 and between 1987 and 1992.
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Sierra Leone (see below). Instead, it formalised the de facto ‘territorial 
power-sharing’ reality brought about by the armed conf lict. This means that 
RENAMO and the FRELIMO-led government maintained administrative 
management over the areas under their respective control at the time of the 
signing of the agreement. In this regard, public administration services in 
RENAMO-controlled areas could employ only citizens residing in those 
areas (including RENAMO’s members). 
At the same time, the government was requested to afford these ‘public 
servants’ and the institutions under their care the respect, treatment and 
support required for the discharge of their duties – on a basis of strict 
equality and without any discrimination in relation to others performing 
similar duties at the same level in areas under FRELIMO’s control.5
In order to ensure a smooth coordination between these two new public 
administrations, the parties established an eight-member National 
Commission (four from each side) that remained in place until the end 
of the ‘transition’. Inasmuch as the agreement could be commended for 
providing ample details regarding the country’s new political system, 
the electoral process and the reform of the security sector – among other 
things, it fell short of providing a clear and meaningful leadership on the 
issue of transitional justice as shall be shown later.
5 See General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 1992 – Protocol V: Guarantees, Specific 
guarantees for the period from the cease-fire to the holding of the elections, III 9.(d). 
It ought to be mentioned that the long-term consequences of the peculiar territorial power-
sharing model applied in Mozambique has been the projection of wartime confrontational 
logic onto Mozambican politics: there were limited levels of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration of former RENAMO combatants, and an entrenchment of wartime 
loyalty among former RENAMO combatants toward the group’s leadership while serving 
under the new national defence and security forces. As a result, armed confrontation 
resumed in 2015 between loyalist troops and RENAMO combatants in the latter’s 
stronghold in central Gorongosa. Dissatisfaction with the political system (including the 
outcomes of the 2014 general elections), the need for inclusion of remaining former rebel 
fighters in the regular army, and internal political dynamics within RENAMO are said to 
be behind this resumption of violence.
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In Sierra Leone, the Lomé Agreement represented the main framework that 
helped end the civil war. It provided for power-sharing under a government 
of national unity comprising representatives of President Tejan Kabbah’s 
government, the RUF and other national stakeholders such as political 
parties and civil society. To this effect, Foday Sankoh was appointed Vice-
President and Head of the Commission for the Management of Strategic 
Resources, National Reconstruction and Development; while Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma (who led the military coup against President Kabbah in 
1997) was appointed Chairperson of the Peace Consolidation Commission 
(Tejan-Cole 2009:244). Furthermore, the RUF was awarded four ministries 
(trade and industry; energy and power; land, housing, city planning and 
environment; as well as tourism and culture) and four deputy ministries 
in the national cabinet (Hayner 2007). However, it ought to be mentioned 
that the Lomé Agreement lacked popular support among Sierra Leoneans 
mainly as a consequence of the blanket amnesty it granted for atrocities 
committed by the RUF during the war.
Transitional justice mechanisms in Burundi, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone
Burundi’s Arusha Agreement contained provisions relating to transitional 
justice. It called for amnesty for all crimes committed during the conf lict 
as long as they did not amount to genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and coups d’état. To this effect, the agreement called on the 
UN Security Council to establish an international judicial commission of 
inquiry tasked with investigating acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in the country from independence in July 1962 
to the date of the signing of the agreement (28 August 2000). Furthermore, 
the agreement called upon the Burundian government to work with the UN 
Security Council towards the establishment of an international tribunal, 
should the commission referred to above identify cases of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the country during the 
earmarked period. Lastly, the agreement called for the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) tasked with establishing the 
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truth about serious crimes and acts of violence committed in the country 
between 1962 and 2000, identifying victims and perpetrators and, after 
thorough assessment of individual cases, granting amnesty. The TRC 
was also required to make recommendations on reparation measures for 
victims and other social and political initiatives designed to foster national 
reconciliation and healing.    
Following up on the provisions contained in the Arusha Agreement, in 
August 2000, parliament adopted a law granting temporary immunity 
to political leaders returning from exile, including those who may have 
committed crimes between July 1962 and August 2000. This provision was 
later extended to rebel leaders and fighters following their decision to join 
the transitional dispensation. 
The UN Security Council never established the international judicial 
commission alluded to in the Arusha Agreement. Instead, the Council 
encouraged the Burundian political leadership to set up the TRC as 
provided for in the agreement6 and remained opposed to the government 
of Burundi granting any amnesty on the gross crimes as mentioned above. 
On 15 May 2014, President Pierre Nkurunziza enacted Law No 1/18 relating 
to the establishment, mandate, composition, organisation and working of 
the TRC.7 This was followed by Decree No 100/286 signed by President 
Nkurunziza on 8 December 2014 and through which he appointed the TRC 
commissioners after they had been approved by parliament as provided for 
in Law No 1/18. It ought to be highlighted that, although commendable, 
this development came very late. If anything, the work of the TRC was 
undermined by the tense socio-political situation in which it was established 
6 Beside the provisions of the Arusha Agreement, the case for the TRC was further 
emphasised during the national consultations on transitional justice organised in 2009. 
The vast majority of the 3 887 respondents indicated their preference for the country’s 
transitional justice programme to be anchored on truth, justice and reparations 
(International Centre for Transitional Justice 2011:16).
7 It ought to be noted that the Burundian parliament adopted the law establishing the TRC 
on 17 April 2014 amid a boycott of the parliament session by UPRONA’s members of 
parliament, despite their party’s alliance with the ruling CNDD-FDD.
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as related to the controversial 2015 general elections and their aftermath. 
The TRC found itself outpaced by political events while the relevance of 
its work was questioned by different role players throughout the country’s 
socio-political spectrum.
In contrast to the Arusha Agreement, the General Peace Agreement for 
Mozambique did not provide for a transitional judicial mechanism. Instead, 
the Mozambican government unilaterally granted a legislative amnesty 
to all combatants well before the start of actual peace negotiations with 
RENAMO (Almeida, Sanches and Raimundo 2010:11). Such a move was 
designed to assure RENAMO’s leadership of the government’s commitment 
to a peaceful settlement.
Although both parties openly acknowledged the human and material costs 
of the civil war, none of them was eager to apologise publicly for their role 
in the violence. The shared sentiment among them was that the people of 
Mozambique needed not to focus on the past but rather invest their energy 
in a future peaceful and developing country. As Igreja (2009:278) observes, 
the parties to the Mozambican peace agreement 
… deliberately precluded any possibility for the enactment of a mechanism 
for justice that could reckon with the grave abuses and war crimes. Justice 
was considered inimical to the peace-building process and was therefore 
replaced with a discourse of reconciliation that was expressed through 
oblivion and silence. 
To this effect, just 10 days following the signing of the peace agreement, 
the FRELIMO-controlled Mozambican People’s Assembly adopted Law 
No 15/92 that effectively granted unconditional amnesty for all crimes 
committed in the country between 1976 and 1992. However, although 
the agreement emphasised the need for reconciliation, the Mozambican 
government never set up a truth and reconciliation commission. 
Furthermore, no specific reparation programmes targeting war victims 
were put in place. With their ‘forward-looking’ approach, the FRELIMO-led 
government and RENAMO rejected any idea of justice, be it retributive or 
restorative, in post-civil war Mozambique.
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As far as Sierra Leone is concerned, it ought to be recalled that amnesty 
from prosecution was central to the Lomé Agreement. Article 9 of the 
agreement enjoined the government to ‘take appropriate legal steps to 
grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.’ The same measure 
applied to all combatants and collaborators on both sides of the conf lict 
spectrum in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives 
as members of their respective organisations for the period between 1991 
and 1999. In conforming to the official discourse, these measures were 
expected to contribute toward consolidating the peace and promoting 
national reconciliation. 
Furthermore, the agreement called for the adoption of legislative and other 
measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles 
and other persons, within and outside the country for reasons related to 
the armed conf lict in order to ensure the full exercise of their civil and 
political rights and to fast-track their reintegration. It ought to be noted 
that all these provisions were consistent with demands from the RUF that 
requested a blanket amnesty for all its actions during the civil war.
The Lomé Agreement also provided for the establishment of a TRC tasked 
with addressing impunity, breaking the cycle of violence, providing a 
forum for victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their 
stories and better understand the past, making recommendations on the 
rehabilitation of war victims as well as facilitating genuine reconciliation 
and healing (Hayner 2007:224).
The Sierra Leonean TRC was set up in 2000 through an act of parliament 
and lasted until 2005 when its final report was released to the public. 
However, the actual work of the commission only started in late 2002 as 
a consequence of disagreements over the suitability of commissioners put 
forward by the parties to the conf lict, the resurgence of violence in the 
country and the reluctance of international donors to support a process 
that they regarded as controlled by former belligerents. 
In its early days, the TRC focused its work on raising public awareness on 
its mandate, role, implementation plan and difference with the country’s 
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other transitional justice mechanisms so as to foster public participation 
in its work. This initial phase was followed by the actual work of the 
commission that involved statements taking, hearings and the writing of 
the report (Ekiyor 2009). 
Ultimately, the TRC received close to 8 000 statements from a variety of 
stakeholders (Ekiyor 2009). The recommendations put forward by the 
commission included a call for national, community and inter-personal 
reconciliation; the implementation of a reparations programme for 
victims (access to pensions, micro-credits, free health care, education, 
skills and training) as well as the establishment of a permanent Human 
Rights Commission (HRC). While the HRC was set up as early as 2004 and 
some reparation measures were carried out, the country’s post-civil war 
economic predicament prevented the government from undertaking any 
large-scale reparation programme for the victims.
Lastly, transitional justice mechanisms in post-civil war Sierra Leone also 
included the establishment of the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL). The SCSL was not provided for in the 1999 Lomé Agreement; 
yet, it was popular among ordinary Sierra Leoneans who had borne the 
brunt of the violence perpetrated by warring parties, especially the RUF. 
In fact, the idea of establishing the court emerged as a result of the RUF’s 
determination to pursue military activities in spite of signing the Lomé 
Agreement. The move was regarded by President Kabbah’s government 
and the international community as an opportunity to put into context 
the open-ended amnesty provisions contained in the agreement, as they 
applied to the RUF.
The agreement establishing the SCSL was signed between the UN and the 
government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002. Located in Freetown, 
the court was tasked with prosecuting individuals who bore the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian 
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the country from 30 November 
1996 onward (Tejan-Cole 2009:226, 228). The court was thus designed 
to prosecute only those who played leadership roles in the conf lict. 
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Hence, the low number of those who were prosecuted and eventually 
sentenced, including Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa from the 
government-allied Civil Defence Forces (CDF); Issan Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao from the RUF as well as Alex Brima, Brima 
Kamara and Santigie Kanu from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), all sentenced for jail terms of between six and 50 years. But, the 
most prominent case handled by the SCSL relates to the former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor who was sentenced in May 2012 to a 50-year 
imprisonment for his role in the Sierra Leonean civil war.
Politicised power-sharing and impeded transitional 
justice in post-civil war Burundi, Mozambique and 
Sierra Leone
The section above has highlighted the manner in which Burundi, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone have implemented transitional justice 
processes following their respective civil wars. Despite some similarities, 
a number of differences among the three countries have been noted – 
attributable to the specific conditions within each state and the peculiar 
context of their respective civil wars and post-war situations. However, in 
taking into account the role played by power-sharing in the design and 
the implementation of transitional processes in the three countries, the 
paragraphs below highlight some salient trends derived from Burundi, 
Mozambique and Sierra Leone that may be applicable to countries having 
to pursue transitional justice in the aftermath of civil war ended through 
power-sharing.
Manipulated power-sharing and its negative impact on 
retributive and restorative justice
Whereas transitional justice in post-conf lict countries where internal 
war has ended in military victory by one of the parties tends to turn into 
victors’ justice, the cases of Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone have 
revealed that where war ended through negotiations and power-sharing, it 
tends to turn into warriors’ justice. In these latter settings, justice is only 
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pursued in its dimensions that do not threaten the political survival (and 
sometimes the physical freedom) of the main protagonists, in spite of their 
possible involvement in the commission of crimes and atrocities during the 
war period. This is mainly due to the fact that, in most cases, the suspected 
criminals are directly involved in state management during the transition 
and beyond. This state of affairs helps understand the total absence of 
lustration measures in transitional justice processes implemented in 
post-war Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone as analysed in this article.
Although in Sierra Leone, some senior armed groups’ leaders (including 
Foday Sankoh) were successfully prosecuted, this only became possible 
after international peacekeeping intervention had significantly boosted the 
position of President Kabbah’s government, bringing the country into a 
de facto situation of a civil war won by the government.
Furthermore, while Mozambique chose to totally ignore all aspects of 
retributive and restorative post-war justice and Burundi failed to effectively 
implement several aspects of transitional justice mechanisms contained 
in the Arusha Agreement, Sierra Leone ought to be commended for 
actually establishing a fully functional TRC and the SCSL that successfully 
prosecuted a number of individuals implicated in the commission of the 
gravest crimes during the country’s civil war.
Elite-driven Truth and Reconciliation Commissions with a 
negative impact on retributive justice
The fascination with TRC processes, as far as Africa is concerned, can be 
traced back to South Africa. In order to deal with the past legacy of violence 
that included centuries of white minority domination, 45 years of legalised 
racial discrimination and decades of armed resistance, South Africa 
adopted the TRC in 1995 on the premise that the country could only move 
forward by uncovering and documenting the truth as well as reconciling 
with itself. Furthermore, the context of the emergence of the South African 
TRC model was conducive to its adoption in many African countries that, 
like South Africa, had chosen negotiation and power-sharing as preferred 
mechanisms to end their respective civil wars.
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As highlighted in the previous section, no truth and reconciliation 
commission or mechanism was ever provided for in the General Peace 
Agreement for Mozambique. In Burundi, the process of establishing the 
TRC provided for in the Arusha Agreement experienced several setbacks as 
a result of the eagerness of the two largest political parties to the Agreement 
and the transition (UPRONA and FRODEBU) – joined since by the ruling 
CNDD-FDD – to ensure their direct control over this transitional justice 
mechanism (International Centre for Transitional Justice 2011:10).
In Sierra Leone, the TRC achieved much under very difficult circumstances. 
Its work enabled an open national debate on the root causes of the country’s 
civil war and the implementation of some reparation programmes for 
the victims. Yet, it needed the political elite’s support for the effective 
implementation of its recommendations. In both Burundi and Sierra 
Leone, the main perception is that the TRC was designed and managed in 
a way that does not threaten the physical freedom and political worthiness 
of political elites. In spite of the opportunity it provided to the country’s 
people to uncover the truth surrounding the civil war, the Sierra Leonean 
TRC still fell short of imposing meaningful retributive measures (judicial 
prosecution or vetting) to senior political elites, including those involved 
in the commission of wartime crimes and atrocities.
Power-sharing and the imbalance between demanded 
amnesties and deserved reparations
Amnesty represents the only transitional justice mechanism that cuts 
across all the three countries analysed in this article. Of course, internal 
predicaments specific to each country determined the scope and content of 
amnesty laws and measures adopted by each of them.
It should be admitted that the prominent place afforded to amnesty in the 
three countries was, to a very large extent, a consequence of the adoption of 
power-sharing as the principal means to end the war in the three countries.
In all three countries, some forms of amnesty laws and measures were 
enacted prior to the conclusion of peace agreements between the government 
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and rebel groups as a demonstration by the former of its commitment to a 
peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the adoption of amnesty laws or 
measures was a response to demands from armed groups that regarded such 
action as sine qua non for their commitment to a negotiated settlement. 
The case of Sierra Leone is eloquent in this regard.
Still, after inclusive transitional institutions were put in place, former 
warring parties (either affiliated with the former government or with 
former rebel groups) used their newly earned privileged positions to issue 
further amnesty measures and laws designed to benefit wartime crime 
suspects. This was for instance the case in Burundi where a number of 
amnesty measures and laws have been taken since the signing of the Arusha 
Agreement in 2000.
While power-sharing was central to the adoption of wide amnesty measures 
and laws in post-civil war Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, it did 
not make similar provisions for reparation measures aimed at victims. 
In this regard, Mozambique totally ignored the victims of what was actually 
a very atrocious civil war with devastating consequences for very large 
numbers of the civilian population. On its part, the Arusha Agreement for 
Burundi failed to include victims’ reparation as a specific aspect of the 
country’s transitional justice package. Perhaps, there was an expectation 
from all involved parties that the issue of victims’ reparation would 
be addressed by the country’s TRC as provided for in the Agreement. 
Only Sierra Leone implemented victims’ reparation measures following on 
the TRC’s recommendations.
As may be learned from the Burundian, Mozambican and Sierra Leonean 
cases analysed in this article, power-sharing (as a means to end civil war) 
tends to provide former warring parties an opportunity to request and 
secure amnesty laws and measures for themselves. It does not necessarily 
cater as much for the victims. To this end, it is not exaggerated to argue that, 
in spite of efforts to address its impunity aspects, power-sharing brings 
an imbalance between amnesty and victims’ reparations in post-civil 
war societies. Indeed, power-sharing significantly reduces the possibility 
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for those suspected of committing wartime crimes and atrocities to face 
retributive justice. At the same time, as a result of the central role it affords 
to those suspected of committing wartime crimes and atrocities in the 
post-war dispensation, power-sharing tends to place the fate of war victims – 
including their quest for justice – in the hands of their very victimisers.
Power-sharing which avoids or politicises referrals to the 
international judicial system
In Mozambique, parties to the General Peace Agreement, i.e. the FRELIMO-
controlled government and RENAMO, never made any reference to 
the international judicial system as a means for addressing crimes and 
atrocities committed during the country’s civil war. In Burundi, the 
Arusha Agreement left open, in theory, the possibility for a recourse to 
the international judicial system in the form of an international tribunal. 
However, in practice, no internationally-inspired court was set up in/for 
Burundi. In similar vein, no referral to the international judicial system 
was made by Burundian transitional and post-transitional authorities.
Sierra Leone represents the only country, among the three analysed in this 
article, to have made use of the international justice system in dealing with 
atrocities committed during the country’s civil war. However, as may be 
recalled, the 1999 Lomé Agreement did not provide for any retributive 
justice mechanism. Instead, as a result of the RUF’s pressure, the agreement 
made extensive provisions for amnesty. In this context, the establishment 
of a retributive justice mechanism, as symbolised by the SCSL, was only 
made possible after the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative 
(for Sierra Leone), Francis Okello, reminded the parties that the amnesty 
provisions contained in the 1999 Lomé Agreement could not apply 
to war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide. This 
position was further reinforced after the RUF attacked and killed civilian 
populations in Freetown as they marched to protest against the group’s 
lack of commitment to peace. Still, as argued earlier, the eagerness of the 
international community and the Sierra Leonean government to explore 
judicial prosecution as one of the country’s transitional justice mechanisms 
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was only made possible after significant international military intervention 
(mainly from Britain) had helped strengthen the Kabbah government’s 
position against the RUF and its allies.
It is important to observe that the SCSL spread the blame of civil war 
atrocities on all non-state parties by sentencing leaders of the RUF, the 
AFRC and the CDF. Although CDF leaders, allied to the government, were 
prosecuted, there is need to emphasise that government and national army 
leadership were absolved of any wrongdoing during the civil war. This was 
despite the government’s involvement in the Liberian civil war, albeit, in a 
retaliatory move against Charles Taylor’s meddling with the Sierra Leonean 
civil war.
Perhaps, the most blatant case of politicisation of the international judicial 
system, as far as Sierra Leone is concerned, relates to Charles Taylor. He had 
agreed to vacate the Liberian presidency in 2003 after he was guaranteed 
by ECOWAS leaders that he would not be prosecuted for his involvement 
in the Sierra Leonean civil war (Souaré 2008:212–213). This guarantee was 
later abandoned and Taylor was prosecuted and eventually sentenced to a 
50-year jail term, raising the concern that threat of judicial prosecution 
(or withdrawal thereof) had become a tool to constrain political actors to 
specific actions.
The experiences of Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone analysed 
herein reveal that post-civil war countries where conf lict ended through a 
power-sharing-based agreement tend to avoid recourse to the international 
judicial system. This can be seen as forming part of former warring 
parties’ strategy not to expose themselves to the risk of prosecution in 
judicial institutions over which they have no meaningful control. Sierra 
Leone was able to steer away from this dominant trend after involvement 
from international role players contributed to weakening significantly the 
position of Foday Sankoh’s RUF and its allies. Yet, as shown in this article, 
although commendable, the overall success of the SCSL was limited.
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Nonetheless, commendable, yet limited efforts towards 
institutional reforms 
Besides providing for amnesty and the establishment of TRCs, the Arusha 
and Lomé Agreements for Burundi and Sierra Leone called for institutional 
reforms, including the establishment of national human rights commissions 
and, in the case of Burundi, the office of ombudsman. In Burundi, the 
Office of Ombudsman was established in January 2010, a year before the 
establishment of the National Independent Human Rights Commission 
(CNIDH), while Sierra Leone set up its Human Rights Commission as early 
as August 2004.
In Mozambique, the end of the country’s civil war brought an end to the 
single party system and enabled the adoption of multiparty democracy. 
In Burundi, the process involved in resolving the country’s conf lict also 
incidentally led to the overhaul of the country’s political system through 
the establishment of an ethnic-based democratic regime that remains 
in place to this day. The Arusha Agreement is also credited with the 
establishment in May 2006 of the National Commission on Land and Other 
Assets (CNTB) tasked with, amongst other things, resolving land disputes 
as they relate to those displaced by the country’s cyclic episodes of political 
violence (both Internally Displaced Persons and returning refugees).8 
Lastly, the processes involved in ending civil wars have also enabled the 
establishment of autonomous election management bodies in all countries 
analysed in this article.
Conclusion
Countries emerging from civil wars face daunting challenges, most of 
which they can hardly overcome even with meaningful external assistance. 
Transitional justice constitutes one among such challenges. As this article 
has shown, Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone have all had to deal 
8 The Commission succeeded in providing the citizenry with an alternative framework to 
the conventional court system to resolve land-related conflicts. For a discussion on the 
working of the CNTB, see for instance Isbell (2017).   
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with demands for transitional justice in the aftermath of their respective 
civil wars. To a large extent, these demands were the result of the highly 
violent nature of these civil wars that affected large numbers of the 
civilian populations.
The article has found that, by affording warring parties a prominent role 
in the post-settlement environment, the power-sharing mechanisms set 
up in Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone inadvertently impeded the 
pursuit of both restorative and retributive justice in all three countries. 
As an instance of warriors’ justice, power-sharing was used by such actors 
as an instrument to avoid facing retributive justice. Indeed, due to the 
central position they held within the power-sharing dispensations, former 
warriors emphasised amnesty while paying lip service to reparations. In all 
three countries, the decision to revert to the international judicial system or 
not was mainly motivated by political calculations rather than any genuine 
concern for justice. Lastly, notwithstanding the shortcomings above, the 
consensus generally brought about by power-sharing dispensations enabled 
all three countries to effect institutional reforms, albeit with limited and 
different levels of success.    
This article analysed the role of power-sharing in the design and the 
operationalisation of transitional justice mechanisms in post-civil war 
Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Future research ought to go 
beyond just power-sharing to look into the contribution of other variables 
such as the economic situation and external inf luences in shaping 
transitional justice in African countries emerging from protracted internal 
wars ended through negotiations.
Meanwhile, in learning from Burundi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, the 
proposals below ought to be considered with regard to addressing the tensions 
between power-sharing and transitional justice in such post-war settings:
•	 Transitional justice processes ought to include the larger public and not 
just be elite-focused.
•	 There is need to acknowledge the virtual impossibility to prosecute 
all wartime crimes perpetrators in the short term. Provisions ought 
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therefore to be made for war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide to be prosecuted – even if a longer period than that of the 
initial transition is required.
•	 The provision of amnesty should always be conditional on potential 
beneficiaries committing to open up to the TRC.
•	 Care ought to be taken to ensure that the TRC’s recommendations on 
victims’ compensations are fully complied with by the government and 
all relevant stakeholders. 
•	 Lastly, adequate space, capacity and resources ought to be afforded to civil 
society entities – especially community-based organisations – so as to 
enable them to play a meaningful role in the transitional justice process.
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